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STATEMENT OF' FACTS 
A chronological statement of the facts out of which 
this litigation grew, aside from the findings in each of the 
cases, we think will do much toward eliminating the utter 
confusion that exists because of continuous litigation ex-
tending over a period of years. 
On November 23, 1926, John W. Smith entered into a 
contract to purchase from M. M. Johnson, receiver of the 
Nielson-Burton Company, co-partnership, 473.67 acres of 
land together with 180 shares of the water stock of the 
Pocatello Pipe Line Company for the .sum of $10,118.78. 
Nothing was paid on account of the purchase price of the 
property at the time of the execution of the agreement. 
The first payment of $2,000.00 was to be made on or before 
the 25th day of November, 1927, and $2,000.00 each year 
thereafter. The contract is in evidence as Exhibit 3. It 
contained the usual provisions for the payment of taxes 
and the insurance of crops produced by the purchaser, 
and it contained a specific provision for the cultivation 
of the land, planting to fall wheat and for the application 
by the purchaser to the Federal Farm Loan Association 
for a loan upon the property to be paid to the seller and 
further that : 
In the event the buyer shall default in the payment of 
special or general taxes, assessments or insurance prem-
iums, as provided for, that the seller might pay the taxes 
and collect from the buyer with interest at the rate of one 
percent per month; that the buyer should make reports 
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And further 
''As security for the payment of any installment 
of the purchase price, any sums due and delinquent 
from previous years, and/or any sums which may 
become due from the purchaser of this contract with-
in any particular year, the buyer hereby mortgages 
to the seller all crops of every kind and nature which 
shall be grown by him or his successors upon the said 
land during the year in which such payment or sums 
shall have become due." (Exhibit 3-Abs. 75.) 
And further 
''In the event the purchaser shall fail to make 
any of said payments, or to perform any of the 
covenants herein by him agreed to be performed 
within thirty (30) days after written notice of de-
fault and demand for performance of the covenant 
or covenants as to which it may be claimed he is in 
default shall have been served upon him by the sel-
ler personally, or in the manner provided by law for 
serving notices, or by letter addressed to him at 
Ridgedale, Idaho, the seller, at his option, may de-
clare a forfeiture of all of the rights of the purchaser 
under this agreement, and the seller shall thereupon 
be released from all obligation in law and equity to 
convey the said property; and upon such forfeiture 
being declared all rights of the buyer hereunder, and 
all and any interest that he may have in the said 
premises shall immediately cease and terminate, and 
the said buyer shall become at once a tenant at will of 
the seller, anything herein to the contrary notwith-
standing, and the seller may keep and retain all pay-
ments theretofore made by the buyer on account of 
the purchase price as compensation for the use of 
the said property and as liquidated damages for the 
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failure of the buyer to fully perform the contract of 
purchase on his part, and the seller may at his option 
re-enter and take possession of the said property, 
without legal process, as in his first and former es-
tate, together with all improvements and additions 
made by the buyer thereon, including any and all 
crops growing upon said land at the time of the said 
election to terminate and forfeit the said contract, 
and the said additions and improvements and grow-
ing crops shall remain with the land and become the 
property of the seller. It is specifically agreed that 
time is of the essence of this agreement." (Abs. 76.) 
Smith was constantly in default on the contract. He 
failed to pay taxes, and the taxes from the beginning ac-
cumulated and in order to prevent loss of the property 
w:ere paid by the seller. On November 25, 1930, an in-
stallment of $2,000.00 came due with accumulated inter-
est at seven percent per annum on the entire amount. The 
buyer had no means of making this payment by reason 
of which the contract was not only subject to forfeiture, 
but forfeiture was inevitable. (Abs. 78-79.) 
Smith had been sued by Wilse A. Nielson, the son of 
A. J. Nielson, one of the partners in the business for 
which Johnson was made receiver. He had defaulted to 
the extent of $1208.91 besides interest in December of 
1929. (Exhibit E.) The taxes had not been paid for 1926, 
1927 and 1928 and were delinquent for 1924 on part of the 
ground. The taxes amounted to $410.79. (Exhibit E.) 
This amount was bearing interest at one percent per 
month. In addition to his troubles growing out of de-
linquencies, which he could not by any possibility cure, 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
three different ju~oments had been entered against him 
between September 12, 1929, and May 22, 1930. He had 
exhausted his credit at the banks and with relatives and 
it therefore became certain that if Johnson, the receiver, 
should so elect, the contract was at an end. (Abs. 82-83-
89.) 
Furthermore Smith's equipment was not such that he 
could cultivate the land economically and hope to be able 
to make enough money from the land to take up de-
linquencies and pay the contract out. His son, Cameron 
Smith, had credit sufficient to enable him to borrow 
$1,000.00 from the bank and this he used to pay on the 
contract. He also had a new tractor which had cost him 
$1500.00 and he was willing to transfer it so as to save the 
contract. ( Abs. 82, 90.) 
At that time, Smith had residing with him a dependent 
daughter and was entitled to a homestead exemption of 
$2300.00. ( Abs. 101.) 
He and his sons and his daughters thereupon organ-
ized the Smith Land Company and by assignment trans-
ferred to the corporation the contract for the purchase 
of the land, the corporation assuming the balance due 
upon the contract. Cameron Smith was given credit for 
the $1,000.00 paid to keep the contract alive. In addition 
to the contract there was transferred to the corporation 
the caterpillar tractor of a value of $1500.00 and horses 
and farm equipment then on the place. (Abs. 67.) The 
caterpillar tractor was used to plow and cultivate the land 
and to harvest the crops. Cameron Smith, for the most 
part, operated the tractor and combine harvester and 
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plows. Stock of the corporation was is.sued to various 
members of the family and stock of the par value of 
$2800.00 out of an authorized capital of $10,000.00 was 
issued to John Smith as trustee which he testified was 
intended to be used to pay creditors including the plain-
tiff and his assignor in this case. The uncontradicted 
testimony is that John W. Smith was indebted to his 
daughter and to his mother and brothers for money bor-
rowed in attempting so save the contract. (Abs. 82.) His 
testimony is that he offered to issue stock of the cor-
poration to plaintiff and his assignor and that they re-
fused to accept it. (Abs. 79.) Payments upon the con-
tract were made by the corporation between November 
28, 1930, and November 29, 1932. (Exhibit 9.) 
And on November 29, 1932, Charles D. Moore, who 
was then proposing to acquire title to the land and con-
tract asked Smith, the Smith Land Company and Care-
ron Smith to agree that if he acquired the contract that a 
new contract would be made by the terms of which the 
balance due would be fixed at $4,000.00 payable in install-
ments, $1,000.00 cash and $1,000.00 annually thereafter 
with eight percent interest. The agreement included the 
Smith Land Company, John vV. Smith and J. Cameron 
Smith. A new form of contract was not executed but the 
proposal adopted the terms of the original contract and 
clearly recognized the interest of the Smith Land Com-
pany in and to it. (Abs. 59.) Numerous letters were ad-
dressed to the Smith Land Company by Charles D. Moore 
as owner of the land and the contract. He, at all times, 
recognized the Smith Land Company as a corporation 
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and as the owner of the contract. (See letters and re-
ceipt. Exhibit 9.) 
On the 16th day of August, 1930, Bertha Skeen, a 
judgment creditor represented by her husband, D. A. 
Skeen caused execution to be issued out of the office of the 
clerk of the district court for Box Elder County and the 
sheriff, by praecipe was directed, to levy upon the de-
fendants' property : 
''To the Sheriff of Box Elder County: 
You will please proceed to levy upon any property 
either real or personal which you may locate belong-
ing to the defendants in Box Elder County, State of 
Utah, and advertise the same for sale pursuant to 
the execution and levy as soon as you may do so.'' 
D. A. Skeen 
Attorney for Plaintiff" (Abs. 114.) 
On December 3, 1930, a return was attached to the 
execution and deposited in the office of the sheriff. The 
execution was handled by Joseph R. Olsen, a deputy who 
thereafter died. There was attached to the execution as 
an exhibit the following letter. 
To John Zundell: 
''Dear Sir: 
John W. Smith has requested me to advise you that 
he has no money or property out of which the ex-
ecution you hold against him might be satisfied. 
The property he occupies was purchased on con-
tract and title reserved to both the land and the 
crops, any equity he might have had was sold some 
time ago. 
Respectfully, 
J.D. Skeen" (Abs. 113.) 
'1 
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The execution with the return and the exhibit with an 
additional notation by John H. Zundel, Sheriff to the 
effect that the matter was handled by Joseph R. Olsen, 
who was deceased, was filed June 26, 1937. (Abs. 114-
115.) 
The complaint in this case alleges the issuance of the 
execution and its return unsatisfied. (Abs. 2.) 
On December 7, 1936, Wilse A. Nielson, the plaintiff 
herein, having become the owner and holder of the legal 
title to the land covered by the contract and of the con-
tract, served notice of forfeiture of the contract for fail-
ure to pay the balance due upon the purchase price of the 
property amounting to the sum of $2433.88. The notice 
specifies seven particulars wherein the purchaser was in 
default and by virtue of which the forfeiture was to be 
made. ( Abs. 61.) 
Immediately thereafter, the Smith Land Company 
procured part of the necessary money to make the pay-
ment from the sale of wheat and borrowed $1900.00 from 
the wife of John W. Smith, made tender of the total bal-
ance due, and demanded a deed which the plaintiff Niel-
son refused. Suit was brought in Salt Lake County by 
the Smith Land Company for specific performance. (Abs. 
87.) Wilse A. Nielson had brought suit July 9, 1935, and 
the two suits were consolidated by stipulation and were 
brought on for trial. 
On October 10, 1935, John vV. Smith was adjudged a 
voluntary bankrupt. He scheduled as debts : To Bertha 
Skeen, a judgment creditor $100.00; to Wilse A. Nielson, 
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judgment creditor, $54.90, and to Wilse A. Nielson, Judg-
ment creditor, $1278.00. As assets he scheduled a library 
of 1200 books of a value of $500.00, five hundred shares 
of the capital stock of Smith Land Company pledged to 
Andrew W. Smith and a life insurance policy. 
The record of the bankruptcy court show.s a petition 
for confirmation of a sale of the land described in the 
complaint herein, an order confirming a sale to A. F. 
Turley for the sum of $500.00 and a deed from the trustee 
in bankruptcy to A. F. Turley purporting to convey all 
of the Smith assets to Turley. ( Abs. 44.) 
The deed purporting to convey the title, dated April 
14, 1937, from AlbertS. Wheelwright, trustee to Aubrey 
F. Turley specifies all the right, title and interest in and 
to the following described property. Then follows de-
scription of the property covered by the contract from 
M. M. Johnson, receiver, to John W. Smith. (Exhibit B.) 
On February 4, 1939, the district court made and 
entered an order reading: 
"It is now ordered that Aubrey F. Turley be and 
he hereby is substituted herein for Albert S. Wheel-
wright, Trustee in Bankruptcy of John W. Smith, a 
bankrupt and as such substitute is hereby made a 
party to this action with all rights and liabilities 
accruing to him as such substituted party.'' Dated 
this 4th, 1939. Filed April4, 1939. (Abs. 116.) 
A petition for review of the order of sale in the bank-
ruptcy court was filed in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah and the court is now holding the 
matter under advisement. 
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Separate findings were made in the two cases. In the 
Box Elder County case, the court found the execution and 
delivery of the contract and that at the time of the trial 
of the case, there was $2433.88 due on the purchase price 
of the land. (Abs. 116-131.) There is no finding as to the 
amount due at the time of the assignment of the contract, 
on October 30, 1930. The court further found that John 
W. Smith on or about the 30th day of October, 1930, 
caused the Smith Land Company to be incorporated and 
transferred to it all of his property including the con-
tract and that it was the alter ego of the said John W. 
Smith, that the transfer of stock to members of his family 
was wholly without consideration, except as to the stock 
transferred to J. Cameron Smith in the amount of 
$1,000.00 and that Cameron Smith turned over to the as-
sociation a tractor; that the organization of the Smith 
Land Company was a contrivance to evade and avoid the 
payment of his creditors; that it was made with intent 
to defraud his creditors; that Smith had continued to 
operate through and in the name of the Smith Land Com-
pany; that John W. Smith, on the 30th day of October, 
1930, was not married, but was the head of a family hav-
ing one married daughter and two minor children living 
with him and dependent upon him for support and main-
tenance; that he was entitled to a homestead exemption 
of $2300.00: 
"That at the time of the transfer of the said 
property and the contracts covering the purchase of 
the same and all rights thereunder by John W. Smith 
to Smith Land Company, the said property was of a 
10 
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value of $30.00 per acre and the equity and interest 
of the said John ,V. Smith in said land at said time 
was of a value far in excess of $2300.00. And at the 
time of the trial of this action, the said property so 
held under the contract to purchase thereof and the 
equity of the said purchaser and his successors in 
interest under said contract was of a value far in 
excess of $2300.00 over and above the balance of the 
purchase price and all liens against said property.'' 
(Abs.123.) 
That the organization of the Smith Land Company and 
the transfer of the property was made more than three 
years prior to the filing of the action : 
" . . . but the said transfer was not recorded 
with the County Recorder of Box Elder County, or 
at all, and the facts and circumstances connected with 
the said transfer were not called to the attention of 
the plaintiff and his assignor of said judgment or 
either of them, and the plaintiff and his said as-
signor of said judgment did not know of the said 
transfer and did not have knowledge of facts suf-
ficient to charge them or either of them with knowl-
edge of such transfer until within three years prior 
to the filing of this action or until within one year 
before the 11th day of July, 1935." (Abs. 123.) 
The court finds the entries of the judgments as here-
inabove stated, the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy 
proceeding, the contents of the schedules, that John Smith 
acting through the Smith Land Company on July 1, 1938, 
deposited with the clerk of the district court of Salt Lake 
County $2433.88. That at the time of the filing of the peti-
tion in bankruptcy the property and interest of John W. 
Smith therein constituted an asset and that it passed to 
11 
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the trustee in bankruptcy and then the court finds that 
in the bankruptcy proceeding all the interest of Albert S. 
Wheelwright as trustee was sold to Aubrey F. Turley 
subject only to the homestead exemption of John W. 
Smith and the court further finds: 
"That in the courts of the bankruptcy proceeding, 
costs expenses of administration accrued in said 
bankruptcy proceeding. That no funds have been 
provided by the said bankrupt to pay the said costs 
and expenses. That the only asset of the said bank-
rupt out of which the trustee may pay the said cost 
and expenses and the said judgments of Wilse A. 
Nielson as set out in the findings herein, is the prop-
erty described in these findings." (Abs. 128.) 
From the findings the court concludes that the trans-
fer of John W. Smith to the Smith Land Company of his 
interest in the property was fraudulent. 
''That the intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, is 
entitled to a judgment adjudging, determining and 
fixing a lien upon the said property in these conclu-
sions described, and the whole thereof, for the total 
amount of the said judgments as entered, wHh costs 
and interest accruing thereon to April 1, 1939, and 
for the full amount of the expenses of administra-
tion of the said bankruptcy proceeding in said bank-
ruptcy court as fixed and determined therein, the 
said judgments alone as set out in the findings here-
in, with interest and costs accruing to April1, 1939, 
being in the amount of $2529.36." (Abs. 130.) 
The court entered the decree adjudging and decreeing 
the transfer void over and above a homestead exemption 
to the extent of $2300.00. 
12 
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"That upon the payment by the Smith Land Com-
pany to W. A. Nielson of the smn of $2433.88, as the 
balance of the purchase price due on said property, 
the intervenor, Albert S. 'Vheelwright is entitled to 
a judgment and decree and an order of sale of said 
property to satisfy the said liens in full, together 
with the costs and expenses of such sale." (Abs. 
131.) 
In the Salt Lake County case, the court made sub-
stantially the same findings many of which were not in 
issue, drew substantially the same conclusions and entered 
a decree to the effect that the assignment of John W. 
Smith was void; that the defendant, Wilse A. Nielson, 
execute and deliver to John W. Smith and the Smith 
Land Company, a corporation, a deed of conveyance and 
transfer to them a certificate of stock for 180 shares and 
upon the execution and delivery of such a deed and stock 
that the clerk of the court pay to the said Wilse A. Niel-
son $2433.88 theretofore deposited by the Smith Land 
Company with the clerk of the court as a tender of the 
balance due on the contract. John W. Smith was not a 
party to~the Salt Lake City suit. (Abs. 135-152.) 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
The assignment of errors are long and numerous 
comprising 40 in all and covering 1llh pages of the ab-
stract. We will not reprint them but will summarize the 
specific points upon which we rely for the reversal of 
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1. The homestead exemption was pleaded and found 
without controversy. It did not constitute the subject 
matter of a conveyance in fraud of creditors because it 
was not and is not subject to a judgment lien, execution 
or forced sale. The contract was subject to forfeiture at 
the time of the assignment, long prior thereto and sub-
stantially all of the time subsequent thereto and until 
the tender of the balance due was made just before the 
institution of the Salt Lake case, and there is no finding 
that said contract was of a value in excess of $2300.00. 
(Box Elder Case Assignments Numbers 1, 6, 15, 16, 18. 
Salt Lake Case Assignments Numbers 1, 6, 12, 13, 14, 16, 
17.) 
2. The corporation was recognized by plaintiff, Wilse 
A. Nielson and his predecessors in interest as a valid 
legally organized corporation as early as November, 
1930, and at all times thereafter until tender by it of the 
$2433.88 balance due on the contract, and plaintiff in the 
Box Elder County case and defendants in the Salt Lake 
County case are now estopped from denying the exist-
ence of the corporation and the ownership of the con-
tract. (Box Elder Case Assignments Numbers 3, 12, 13. 
Salt Lake Case 1, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19.) 
3. The Statute of Limitations ran two years before 
the institution of the Box Elder County suit and the cause 
of action, if one ever existed, was barred at the time the 
suit was brought. (Box Elder case Assignments Numbers 
7, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17. Salt Lake case Assignments Num-
bers 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19.) 
4. The court was without jurisdiction to enter any 
14 
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judgment in favor of the intervenor, Albert S. \Vheel-
wright for the reason as alleged that the United States 
Bankruptcy Court had eonfirmed a sale of the interest 
of the said trustee in and to said property, a deed of 
c~nveyance of the interest had been made and the pur-
chaser, and Aubrey F. Turley was substituted as a party 
to the suit for the said trustee. (Box Elder Case Assign-
ments Nos. 8, 9, 14, 16. Salt Lake Case Nos. 14, 18, 20.) 
5. The court had no jurisdiction to enter any judg-
ment based upon an order of the Bankruptcy Court, and 
the provision including in the judgment the costs and ex-
penses alleged to have been taxed in the Bankruptcy 
Court were wholly without jurisdiction and void. (Box 
Elder case Assignments Nos. 8, 9, 14, 16. Salt Lake Case 
Nos.19, 20.) 
6. The judgment is not sustained by the evidence or 
by the :findings. (Box Elder case, Assignments Nos. 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 16, 17. Salt Lake Case Assignments Nos. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 16 17.) 
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
Under Article 22, Section 1 of the Constitution and 
Title 38 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, the homestead 
exemption is absolute. The numerous decisions of this 
court leave nothing open for argument. Smith was the 
head of a family under Section 38-0-5 and the property 
constituted a homestead exemption to the value of 
$2300.00. It was not subject to a judgment lien under 
104-30-15 because the statute makes it a lien only upon 
15 
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property "not exempt from execution," and it was not 
subject to execution sale because of Title 38 and Title 
104, Chapter 37, and it was not the subject matter of an 
attack for sale or other disposition in fraud of creditors. 
The right to a homestead is an absolute right which 
neither the legislature nor the courts can infringe. Pan-
agopulos vs. Manning, 93 Utah 198, 69 P. (2d) 614. 
Neither the legislature nor the courts have the right 
to subject it to a forced sale. Utah Builders Supply Co. 
vs. Gardner, 86 Utah 257. 
The homestead may be sold and a good title passed. 
Revised Statutes Title 38-0-2. 
''A homestead cannot be made the subject of at-
tack by a creditor upon the ground that it was sold 
or conveyed in fraud of such creditor." (Payson, 
etc., vs. Tietjen, 63 Utah 321.) 
The plaintiff in attacking a transfer must allege and 
prove that the value of the property exceeded the exemp-
tion allowed by statute. Crosby vs. Anderson, 49 Utah 
167, 162 P. 75. 
To hold as the lower court has done that a homestead 
conveyed continued to be .subject to attack nullifies sec-
tion 38-0-2 which reads : 
'' . . . when a homestead is conveyed by the 
owner thereof such conveyance shall not subject the 
premises to any lien or encumbrance to which it 
would not be subject in the hands of the owner; and 
the proceeds of the sale thereof to the amount of the 
exemption existing at the time of sale shall be ex-
empt from execution or other process for one year 
16 
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after the receipt thereof by the person entitled to 
exemption.'' 
The value at the time of the sale of the homestead is 
to be determined by the court, as stated by Justice Straup 
in Giesy Walker Company vs. Briggs, 49 Utah 205, 220, 
162 P. 876. 
"It is the amount of the exemption of the pro-
ceeds of a sale of a homestead which is fixed as of 
the time of the sale of the homestead not of the levy. 
But property subject to levy, whether proceeds of 
sale or other property, is as of the time of the levy; 
that is the creditor by levy may take only such prop-
erty as at the time of the levy is not exempt and is 
subject to levy.'' 
In utter disregard of this statute, the court heard evi-
dence as to the value of the land at the time of the trial 
and made a finding that the value then exceeded the home-
stead exemption of $2300.00. No evidence was offered as 
to the value of the contract which was about to be for-
feited and which then by the findings of the court consti-
tuted the homestead exemption of John W. Smith. No 
finding was made as to the value at that time, but on the 
contrary, the court treated the conveyance which was 
authorized by the statute quoted as utterly void and at-
tempted to subject the land itself to a judgment seven 
years later. 
By such a sale homestead property would be taken 
out of the class of property subject to mortgage and sale 
and the owners would be deprived of one of its principal 
values; that is the right of sale and disposition. The stat-
17 
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ute was enacted pursuant to the terms of the constitution, 
Article 22, Section 1 and cannot be disregarded. 
The contract at the time of the assignment from John 
W. Smith to the Smith Land Company was subject to 
delinquencies in payments, delinquencies in taxes and 
failures to make report. The contract then was not sub-
ject to judgment lien or execution sale because there was 
a large balance due upon the contract and evidently when 
Nielson, through his attorney, directed the sale of the 
property by the sheriff, the directions were not followed 
up because there was no equity to be sold. The plaintiff 
alleges in the Box Elder County case that executions were 
issued and returned wholly unsatisfied. (Abs. 2.) 
By reference to the abstract, page 112, it will he seen 
that execution was issued upon the request of Benjamin 
Spence, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff, and the 
sheriff was specifically directed to levy upon the prop-
erty of John W. Smith. The execution was issued on the 
16th day of August, 1930, about two months before the 
contract was assigned. The return was prepared by the 
deputy, since deceased, on December 3, 1930, to the effect 
that he had made due search and inquiry and no prop-
erty had been found. Plaintiff was not in a position to 
controvert the return because he alleges the fact in the 
complaint, repeats it by adoption in the complaint in in-
tervention and in the amended complaint filed June 22, 
1937, and adopts it in the amendn1ent to the complaint in 
intervention. 
Nielson lived in the locality of the land. He saw the 
crops planted and harvested. He knew of the contract of 
18 
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sale between Johnson and Smith and with a reservation 
of a lien upon the crops as security for the payment of 
the purchase price of the land; if, as now claimed, there 
was an appreciable equity in the contract, subject to sale, 
it would have been sold. 
No evidence was offered or receiYed as to any value 
in the contract on the 30th day of October, 1930, upon 
which the court could base a finding. 
The court finds : 
'' . . . that the said property was of a value 
of $30.00 per acre and the equity and interest of the 
said John W. Smith in said land at said time was of 
a value far in exc~ss of $2300.00." (Abs. 123.) 
And further: 
That the value was in excess of $2300.00 at the time 
of the trial. (Finding No. 10, page 123 of the abstract.) 
There is no evidence to support such a finding. Evi-
dence was offered by the plaintiff as to the rental value of 
the land (Abs. 45) and as to the value of the land (Abs. 
102) but nowhere as to the value of a defaulted contract, 
subject to forefeiture. There is evidence to the effect 
that the trustee sold the interest of John W. Smith in 
the property even after payments had been made from 
1930 to date of sale, March 9, 1937, for the sum of $500.00 
which was the fair value of the property. (Abs. 44.) 
And there is evidence that on December 7, 1936, after 
payments had been made from October, 1930, to that 
date, that the contract was still subject to forfeiture and 
forfeiture was declared and notice thereof given, which, 
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but for the timely advancement of $1900.00 by the wife 
of John W. Smith would have been final. (Abs. 60.) Evi-
dence of the value of the land was of course not evidence 
of the value of the contract because payments on th~ 
contract were to be made before the contract had any 
value whatsoever. There is also the agreement of John 
W. Smith, the Smith Land Company and J. Cameron 
Smith to make a new contract for the purchase of the 
property for the sum of $4,000.00, when Charles D. 
Moore acquired title thereto. (Abs. 59.) 
We assume that this court knows and will take judicial 
notice of the fact that in 1929 the nation-wide depression 
came; that it grew steadily more severe; that loans upon 
farm property ceased to the extent that it became neces-
sary for the United States Government to provide money 
with which to assist the farmer; that the market for 
wheat all but vanished and when a market was found the 
prevailing price for the years intervening between 1930 
and 1933 was about 30c per bushel and that installment 
payments upon wheat land could not be made from crops 
produced. This is reflected in the fact that, although 
through the aid of J. Cameron Smith, $6,000.00 had been 
paid on the contract, there was still $4,000.00 unpaid on 
November 29, 1932, and $2433.88 unpaid when the notice 
of forfeiture was given on December 7, 1936. It cannot 
be claimed by respondent that the contract was not in 
default because on the 7th day of December, 1936, he 
listed seven particulars wherein it was in default and 
then subject to forfeiture. Now, under the circumstances 
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what was the contract worth on October 30, 1930 Y There 
is no evidence. 
Respondent says that the Bankruptcy Court found it 
to be worth $500.00 and authorized its sale for that 
amount, and upon that sale, Aubrey F. Turley, the pur-
chaser, was substituted as a party intervenor and asked 
to be decreed the owner of the property. In the absence 
of other evidence, the court could find only $500.00 value 
in the property, c~rtainly not a value in excess of 
$2300.00. Until it is shown by proper pleading and evi-
dence that there was property on October 30, 1930, sub-
ject to judgment lien, execution and sale, then there coul~ 
be no finding of a conveyance in fraud of creditors. 
THE PLAINTIFF, W. A. NIELSON, IN THE BOX 
ELDER COUNTY CASE AND DEFENDANT 
IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CASE IS 
ESTOPPED BY PRnnTY OF CONTRACT 
AND BY HIS OWN ACTS FROM QUESTION-
ING THE LEGALITY OF THE INCORPORA-
TION OF SMITH LAND CO:MP ANY OF THE 
OWNERSHIP OF THE CONTRACT. 
Bigelow on Fraudulent Conveyance, page 481, refer-
ring to Coke, the author says: 
''Referring to the statute of 13th Elizabeth, Coke 
says that if there is fraud at the outset of a trans-
action, that is actual fraud, nothing afterwards can 
anyways salve and amend the matter. That is to say 
in the language of later times, the fraud of the stat-
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ute of Elizabeth cannot be purged. Whether and how 
far that is true in cases arising under the penal pro-
visions of the statute we do not here inquire; the 
question here is of the civil administration of the 
law. 
The rule of Coke however is not to be taken too 
broadly. It requires no citation or authority to show 
that a creditor who assents e. g. to an assignment by 
his debtor, containing a provision sufficient to avoid 
it as fraudulent, such as a trust for the debtor, is 
barred by his consent from raising objection after-
wards to the assignment for any cause known to him 
when he assented. Indeed it is apprehended that 
Coke's rule was not intended to apply to cases of 
present or subsequent consent or ratification by the 
creditor; that the statute is not to be understood as 
making the transaction void in such a sense as to pre-
vent subsequent recognition of it as binding; and 
that the creditor's consent will always take away the 
taint.'' 
In 2 Pomroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Section 916, 
page 1914, the author says: 
'' . . . while the party entitled to relief may 
either void the transaction or confirm it, he cannot do 
both. If he adopts a part he adopts all. He must 
reject it entirely if he desires to obtain relief." 
And again, Section 964, page 2089, the author says: 
"Where a party originally had a right of can-
cellation or of action to defeat or set aside a trans-
action on the ground of actual or constructive fraud, 
he may lose such remedial right by a subsequent con-
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In Bigelow on Estoppel (sLxth edition), pag-e 744, 
Section 2, the rule is concisely stated: 
''So also one who accepts the terms of a deed or 
other contract must accept the same as a whole; one 
cannot accept part and reject the rest. Thus, a 
party actively affirming a transaction such as a con-
tract or a purchase by receiving and retaining money 
upon it, is estopped thereafter to deny the force of 
any of its express or implied terms or conditions,'' 
and see following cases with these facts in mind. 
The rule applicable to the facts disclosed in this rec-
ord is clearly stated in 1 Fletcher on Corporations, Sec-
tion 356, page 755, as follows : 
''The estoppel of a person dealing with a pre-
tended corporation to deny its legal incorporation 
also operates against persons who stand in his shoes, 
or in other words, who are in privity with him. Thus, 
it clearly operates as against his executor or ad-
ministrator, or his heirs, and against one to whom 
he assigns his contract with the pretended corpora-
tion.'' 
In McLaughlin v. Park City Bank, 22 Utah 484, 63 
Pac. 589, the court said: 
"While a creditor is under no obligation to ac-
cept the provisions of an assignment made for his 
benefit, yet he cannot hold an assignment good in 
part and bad in part. If he ratifies it at all he must 
stand by it. He cannot accept that part which is 
beneficial to him, and repudiate the balance of it. 
Nor can he receive the benefits of the assignment 
while he is in actual hostility to it, claiming in the 
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courts that it is fraudulent and void and refusing to 
accept its benefits. He cannot claim benefits under 
it and at the same time attack it for fraud, and utter-
ly destroy its validity as to him. Burrill on Assign-
ments, Sees. 476-77-79; Jeffries Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 
39; Valentine v. Decker, 43 Mo. 583; Beifield v. 
Martin, 37 Pac. 32; Alder v. People's Bank, 46 S. W. 
536; O'Brien v. Glenn, 17 S. W.1030. 
If a creditor accepts the benefits of an assign-
ment knowing the facts he cannot, ordinarily, im-
peach or repudiate it thereafter, on the ground that 
it is illegal and fraudulent. So, having repudiated it 
altogether, he cannot take under its provision as 
other creditors would do who have accepted it. The 
reason of this rule is that he is not entitled to two 
inconsistent, adverse or conflicting rights. One is 
necessarily a denial of the other. Burrill on As-
signments, (6th ed.) 441; Alder v. Bank, 46 S. W. 
536.'' 
And in Kerslake v. Brower, et al., Oregon, 66 P. 437, 
it is said: 
"A creditor of the assignor, whether provided 
for by the assignment or not, who wishes to repudi-
ate the trusts of the assignment on the ground that 
they are illegal and a fraud upon the honest creditors 
of the assignor must apply to set aside the assign-
ment as fraudulent and void against him as a credi-
tor, instead of coming in under the assignment itself 
as a preferred creditor or otherwise.'' 
Pratt v. Adams, 7 Paige, 615, 641. And Mr. Chief 
Justice Gibson says: ''The books are full of cases 
which show that a party shall not contest the valid-
ity of an instrument from which he draws a benefit, 
nor affirm it in part and disaffirm it in part." Irwin 
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v. Tabb, 17 Serg. & R. 419. See also Frierson v. 
Branch, 30 Ark. 453; Adler-Goldinan Commission 
Co. v. People's Bank, 65 Ark. 380, 46 S. W. 536; 
O'Bryan v. Glenn, 91 Tenn. 106, 17 S. \V. 1030, 30 
... hl. St. Rep. 862; McLaughlin v. Bank (Utah), 63 
Pac. 589. The reason of this rule is that a creditor is 
not entitled to two inconsistent and adverse rights. 
He is required to elect which one he will adopt, and 
the election of one is necessarily the rejection of the 
other." 
Let us take a glance at some of the evidence. As early 
as November 28,1930, about one month after the corpora-
ti{)n was organized and the contract was assigned, C. D. 
Moore, as attorney for M. M. Johnson, wrote demanding 
payment of the $2,000.00 installment then due and closed: 
"In view of the assignment by you to the Smith 
Land Company, I am sending a similar letter to it. 
I am also mailing a copy of both addressed jointly 
to y{)u and the company at Blue Creek,'' 
and so continued the letters 27 in all and a receipt being 
a part of them received in evidence as Exhibit 9. (Abs. 
88.} 
Furthermore, Moore proposed acquiring this land and 
the contract personally and to make certain as to the bal-
ance due and for the purpose of eliminating continuous 
delinquencies he had Smith write a proposal on behalf of 
himself, the Smith Land Company and J. Cameron Smith 
to fix the balance of the purchase price at $4,000.00 pay-
able in installments of $1,000.00 instead of $2,000.00 and 
to increase the interest from seven to eight percent. It is 
unthinkable that any person would contend that after all 
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these letters had been written, and money continuously 
collected upon the contract in response to the letters that 
either Johnson or Moore could have defended a suit on the 
contract upon the grounds that the Smith Land Company 
was not the owner of the contract and that it in fact was 
not a legal entity. 
But Nielson steps into the shoes of Moore as the As-
signee of Johnson and takes all rights which they held 
and assumed all obligations. He says in his notice: 
''The undersigned as the present owner of said 
property and of said contract and all rights ac-
quired thereunder by the seller therein named here-
by gives you written notice of such defaults." (Abs. 
60.) 
As he acquired the rights under the contract he assumed 
the obligations. He took it as it was with the Smith Land 
Company as the owner and he assumed the obligation 
under the contract to convey the land to the Smith Land 
Company as owner and not otherwise. He could not blow 
hot and cold by demanding money from the Smith Land 
Company and denying its existence in the same breath. 
He could not demand money from any organization with-
out legal existence and without obligation and then deny 
its right to the consideration for the money paid. That is 
precisely what he sought to do. The notice is addressed 
to John W. Smith and to "Smith Land Company," a cor-
poration. It says: 
"You are hereby notified that by reason of your 
default in the performance of the covenants and con-
ditions of that certain contract entered into by and 
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--
--
between M. M. Johnson as receiver of Nielson-Bur-
ton Company and John W. Smith on the 23rd day of 
November, 1936, covering the following described 
property, located in Box Elder County, Utah," then 
follows a description of the land, etc. (Abs. 60.) 
How comes it that the Smith Land Company was in de-
fault in the performance of the covenants and conditions 
if it had no legal existence and if it were not obligated on 
the contract! That notice was given with full knowledge 
of all the transactions affecting the contract since its ex-
ecution and admittedly by the pleadings Nielson knew all 
of these facts from and after 1935. And continuing after 
specifying seven different particulars wherein the Smith 
Land Company was in default, Nielson said: 
''Upon your failure (certainly directed to the 
Smith Land Company) to comply with the terms and 
the covenants and conditions set out in said contract 
within thirty days after this written notice of de-
fault and demand for performance and to pay the 
costs and expenses of enforcing the said agreement, 
the undersigned as present owner of said property 
and of all rights of the seller in said contract named 
will declare a forfeiture of all rights of the pur-
chaser, and any successor to the said purchaser, un-
der the agreement and will take immediate posses-
sion of the said property and the whole thereof, and 
otherwise enforce all rights of the seller, or his as-
signs under the said contract,'' 
and that was dated December, 1936, and signed Wilse A. 
Nielson. ( Abs. 61.) 
It would not be contended that upon payment of the 
balance of the purchase price, Wilse A. Nielson was not 
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obligated to convey the land in accordance with the terms 
of the contract and the notice clearly recognized "any 
successor to the said purchaser'' and hence Nielson was 
obligated to convey to the assignee of the purchaser. No 
question of the assignability of the contract is or could be 
raised. Within the thirty day period the money was 
tendered by Smith Land Company as successor of John 
W. Smith but the tender wa.s refused because the Smith 
Land Company had no legal existence and was not the 
owner of the contract. The money was then deposited 
with the Clerk of the Court and Nielson took the money 
at the same time denying the existence of the payor and 
of its right to receive the deed. He assumed inconsistent 
positions which have never been permitted since the law 
of contracts came into existence. 
In the light of these authorities can there be any doubt 
that when Nielson served notice of intention to forfeit 
upon the Smith Land Company, he elected to treat it as 
the owner of the contract and as being obligated to pay 
him the money which he demanded. He was no doubt 
barred from prosecuting the suit to .set aside the assign-
ment of the contract by becoming the transferee of the 
land and the contract. He sought, as he states, to in some 
form merge the judgments into the contract by acquiring 
the title of the ownership o£ the land and the contract 
and he took the title with an obligation to convey upon 
receipt of the balance of the purchase price under the 
same conditions that the land was held by Moore. He 
acquired no greater rights than Moore himself held and 
he assumed all the obligations and limitations which 
28 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Moore had subjected himself to by his continuous de-
mands upon the Smith Land Company for money and the 
response of the Smith Land Company to the demand by 
payment to him on account of the purchase price of the 
property. The estoppel was in every respect complete. 
THE BOX ELDER COUNTY CASE WAS 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIONS. 
The assignment of the contract to the Smith Land 
Company was made on October 4, 1930. (Abs. 67.) The 
snit was filed July 9, 1935. Nielson, the plaintiff, lived 
neighbor to John W. Smith and his land was near the 
Smith land. He was constantly in touch with Smith and 
observed the operations on the land. The complaint al-
leges that upon the entry of the judgment set out in the 
complaint, execution was issued and delivered to the 
Sheriff of Box Elder County and said executions were 
duly returned by the sheriff wholly unsa tis:fied and ''the 
said judgments or any part thereof have not been paid.'' 
Fortunately the praecipe for the issuance of the execu-
tion, the execution and the return are all in the record. 
The sheriff was directed to levy upon the real or pers·on-
al property and advertise the same for sale, ''as soon as 
you may do so." The sheriff received the execution on 
September 26, 1930, and made his return the 3rd day of 
December, 1930. It is true the writ was not filed in the 
clerk's office. But the plaintiff alleges the return. He 
was fully informed, otherwise he would not have alleged 
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the contents or the character of the return. The return 
is that: 
"I have made demand upon the within n~"illed de-
fendant, John W. Smith for the payment of the 
within judgment with interest and costs all as 10re 
fully appears in the within writ of execution rhe 
defendant stated then and there if I would call J. D. 
Skeen, he would take care of the within judgm nt as 
he had the money to pay said judgment. I did take 
the matter up with J. D. Skeen and on or about the 
7th day of November, 1930, I received a letter from 
.said J. D. Skeen, a copy of said letter is hereto at-
tached and marked exhibit A and made a part of 
this return. I do further certify and return that I 
have made due and diligent search and inquirv ~vith­
in my jurisdiction and have been unable t\ £1Y 
property belonging to the within named dt~~.t.Ldant 
but what is mortgaged or exempt from execution 
upon which to levy in satisfaction of the within writ. 
I therefore return the within writ unsatisfied.'' 
(Abs. 114.) 
The letter from J. D. Skeen to the sheriff attached to 
the return as Exhibit A says the property that he, "John 
W. Smith," occupied was purchased on contract anc:l 4-1.tle 
reserved to both the rent and the crops. "Any r .;.u..uy he 
might have had was .sold some time ago.'' Add t~ this in-
formation, which, as observed, the plaintiff alleges he had 
and what more could have been told to the plaintiff which 
would have added to his means of knowledge as of De-
cember 3, 1930, and yet he did nothing whatsoever until 
July 9, 1935. The bar of the Statute of Limitations, 104-
2-24 was pleaded. We may say, as this court said in Smith 
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P. (2d) at page 271: 
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"No inquiry of any nature seems to have been 
rs.cle." 
If an.., inquiry had been made, it is apparent that the 
facts would have been disclosed, if any facts other than 
thos~ .iv·en had been desired. It is true that the letter did 
not stale to whom the property had been sold or what 
was r~eived, but even before the sheriff's return Moore, 
as attorney for Johnson, had received notice for in the 
letter of :Xovember 28, 1930, he said so. (Exhibit 9.) 
Nielson conferred with Moore, sought to attach the 
crops but was unable to because the contract was in de-
fault, and Moore said his client had a mortgage. It is 
inco· - · -~ble that in the circumstances Nielson did or 
coulu . ~ closed his eyes to the facts which were ap-
parent on every hand. Under the statute as construed in 
the following cases the suit was barred. 
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 426; 
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S.135, 25 L. ed. 807; 
Pearsall v. Smith, 149 U. S. 231, 37 L. ed. 713; 
Jones Mining Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Mill Com-
' 56 Utah 449, 191 P. 426; 
~..tit Lake City v. Salt Lake Inv. Co., 43 Utah 181, 
134 P. 603; 
Lady Washington Co. v. Wood, 113 Cal. 482, 45 
P. 809. 
See numerous cases cited: 
37 C. J. 939; 
27 c. J. 761; 
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Wood on Limitation of Actions, Section 276 b 
(11). 
The rule is well stated in the case of Jones Mining Co. 
v. Cardiff Mining and Mill Company, supra, 56 Utah re-
ports at page 458. 
"In all such cases the statute begins to run from 
the time the complaining party discovered the 
wrongs complained of or when he was apprised of 
such facts and circumstances with respect thereto as 
would put a person of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence upon inquiry. The law is stated to that 
effect by this court in the case of Gibson v. Jensen, 
48 Utah, 248, 158, Pac. 426, and in Salt Lake City v. 
Investment Co., 43 Utah, 181, 134 Pac. 603. If there-
fore the facts and circumstances which came to the 
knowledge of the plaintiff corporation were .such as 
would have caused a person of ordinary prudence 
and intelligence to act, then it should have acted, 
and the statute of limitations was set in motion as 
to it." 
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Invest-
ment Company, supra, this court quoted with approval 
the following language of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia: 
"The rule is well established that the means of 
knowledge is equivalent to knowledge, and that a 
party who has the opportunity of knowing the facts 
constituting the fraud of which he complains cannot 
be supine and inactive, and afterwards allege a want 
of knowledge that arose by reason of his own laches 
or negligence." (Shain v. Sresovich, 104 Cal. p. 405; 
38 P. page 42.) 
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There is not a word of evidence that Smith concealed the 
facts. The articles of incorporation were filed in the 
county clerk's office and the Secretary of State's office. 
They described the land involved in suit and were public 
reeords. 
It is apparent that W. A. Nielson had the means of 
knowing about the assignment and the cause of action, 
of any, was barred nearly two years before suit was 
commenced. 
THE JUDGMENT AS TO ALBERT S. 
WHEELWRIGHT IS VOID 
Albert S. \\heelwright, as trustee in bankruptcy in 
the matter of John W. Smith, filed a complaint in inter-
vention in the Box Elder County case on April 20, 1936, 
with the attorney who appeared for the plaintiff. He 
filed an amended complaint in intervention, January 12, 
1938, with the same attorney. On the trial of the case, 
the plaintiff introduced in evidence, a petition for an 
order confirming a sale in bankruptcy of the interest of 
the bankrupt in the property covered by the contract be-
tween John W. Smith and M. M. Johnson; also, the 
order confirming the sale and a deed. ( Abs. 43, Deed-
Exhibit B.) Signed and acknowledged April 14, 1937, 
and on February 4, 1939, the court made an order recit-
ing the sale of the interests of the trustee to Aubrey F. 
Turley, and continuing: 
"It is now therefore ordered, that A. F. Turley 
be and he is hereby substituted herein for Albert S. 
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Wheelwright, trustee in bankruptcy of John W. 
Smith, bankrupt, and as such substitute is hereby 
made a party to this action with all rights and lia-
bilities accruing to him as such substituted party. 
Dated this 4th day of February, 1939." (Abs. 116.) 
Finding No. 18, Abstract 127 is: 
"That the said Albert S. Wheelwright, in the 
course of the due administration of the said bank-
ruptcy estate of John W. Smith, caused the said 
real estate and all interest of the said John W. 
Smith therein to be duly offered for sale under 
orders of the court having jurisdiction in said bank-
ruptcy matter and said Albert S. Wheelwright, as 
such trustee, sold and transferred by trustee's deed 
to Aubrey F. Turley all of the right, title and inter-
est of John W. Smith in and to the said property 
and the whole thereof, and pursuant thereto and by 
order of said court, the said Albert S. Wheelwright, 
as such trustee, reported the .said sale to the Court 
and the said sale was by the said Court duly con-
firmed and the consideration for the said transfer 
was paid by the said Aubrey F. Turley to the said 
Albert S. Wheelwright and the said Albert S. Wheel-
wright delivered to said Aubrey F. Turley a deed 
transferring all right, title and interest of the said 
John W. Smith in said property to Aubrey F. Tur-
ley and at the time of the trial of this action the said 
Aubrey F. Turley was the owner of all of the right, 
title and interest of the said John W. Smith so at-
tempted to be transferred in fraud of his creditors 
in and to the said property and the whole thereof 
subject only to the homestead exemption rights of 
the said John W. Smith." 
The proceeding leading up to the .sale by Albert S. 
Wheelwright to Aubrey F. Turley of all of the right, title 
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and interest of John "\V. Smith in and to the property, 
confirmation of the sale and the ronYeyance of the prop-
erty and the allowanee in the eourt of bankruptey of costs 
and expenses of administration that had accrued, the 
finding that there was no money with which to pay the 
same and that the total amount of the judgments pleaded 
with interests amounted to $~4~9.36 were all recited in 
finding 18, 19, and ~0. (Abs. 1~7.) And the court con-
cluded: 
"That the inteiTenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, is 
entitled to a judgment adjudging, determining and 
fixing a lien upon the said property in these con-
clusions described'' ( .Abs. 130) 
the same being the property described in the contract for 
the total amount of the judgment and costs and for the 
full amount of the expense of administration of the said 
bankruptcy proceeding in said bankruptcy court and as 
fixed and determined therein in the amount of $2529.36. 
And further, that upon the payment by the Smith 
Land Company (Abs. 131) of the sum of $2433.88 as the 
balance of the purchase price due on said property, the 
intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, trustee in bank-
ruptcy of John W. Smith, bankrupt, is entitled to a judg-
ment and decree and an order of sale of said property to 
satisfy the said liens in full, together with costs and ex-
penses of such sale. 
The court decreed, that the assignment by John W. 
Smith to the Smith Land Company was void: 
''As to all of said property and rights and inter-
est therein of the said John W. Smith, over and 
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above a homestead exemption therein to the extent 
of $2300.00. '' 
"That upon the payment by the Smith Land 
Company to Wilse A. Nielson of the sum of $2433.88, 
the intervenor, Albert S. Wheelwright, trustee in 
bankruptcy of John W. Smith, bankrupt, have and 
he hereby is given, granted and decreed a first and 
prior lien in, to and upon the following described 
real estate and property in Box Elder County, State 
of Utah, to-wit:" and then follows the description 
of the real estate, "in the amount of $2529.36 and a 
further lien in the amount of $1247.00 being the 
amount of costs and expenses of administration in 
the bankruptcy proceedings of John W. Smith, a 
bankrupt, as fixed and determined by the bank-
ruptcy court in which said proceeding is pending." 
(Abs. 133.) 
At this time, it is necessary to refer to the original 
decree and the judgment roll in the Box Elder County 
case. It will be observed that the judgment was dated 
April 3, 1939, and filed April 4, 1939. Notice of the judg-
ment was given on April 12, 1939. It will be observed 
further that the figures $1247.19 are written in ink. We 
call attention to an instrument purporting to be signed 
by J. T. McConnell, referee in bankruptcy, dated April 
11, 1939, and by which he purports to fix the co.sts and ex-
penses including some $750.00 attorneys' fee.s at $1247.19. 
That instrument was filed in court May 1, 1939. A certi-
fied copy of the proceedings in the federal district court 
will show that the order purporting to fix the fees was 
appealed from and the matter of fixing the fees and the 
costs and expenses has been suspended. Evidently some 
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clerk wrote in the figures in the judooment, ten days after 
it was signed by the judge and filed. 
The mere statement of the facts respecting the items 
of $2529.36 and the $1247.19 condemn the judgment as 
void. Upon what theory can the court find that Wheel-
wright has sold his entire interest in the property giving 
a deed covering the full interest and then impress a judg-
ment lien upon the property for the sum of $2429.36 in 
his favor! .And this too, after finding that the interest of 
John W. Smith in the contract to the extent of $2300.00 
was exempt. Not only is such a judgment not supported 
by the evidence or the findings but upon its face, it is er-
roneous, if not utterly v-oid. 
Furthermore, the court apparently in utter disregard 
of his own records provided for the entry of judgment 
by the Clerk for the amount of a judgment of some other 
court of an entirely different jurisdiction which was to 
be thereafter entered-a thing that is unthinkable. This 
was not a suit upon a judgment or another court. It 
c.onld not have been because no such judgment was 
entered. It is an attempt to execute a judgment to be 
entered by a federal court through and by means of an 
execution of the state court. There is no support under 
the law for any such proceeding. If a judgment under the 
state practice could be predicated upon a judgment of 
the federal court, not then entered, in the same state, cer-
tainly it could be done only upon proper pleadings and 
proof, none of which are in the records in this case. 
An effort was made at the time of the filing of the 
transcript in this case to procure an order of the court 
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authorizing the filing of a certified copy of an order of 
the United States District Court in the matter of John 
W. Smith showing that an appeal had been taken from 
an order of the referee purporting to allow attorneys' 
fees and expenses and that the matter was held under 
advisement by the Federal Court, but for conditions over 
which appellant had no control the motion could not then 
be heard. The motion is now made. 
The court will bear in mind that the order of the ref-
eree in bankruptcy was filed in the District Court for Box 
Elder County after the entry of the judgment. The clerk 
evidently inserted the amount .specified as costs in the 
bankruptcy proceeding in the judgment which had there-
tofore been entered. An appeal was then taken from the 
order of the referee and to date no costs or expenses 
have been allowed. Until the district court passes upon 
the matter, there is no basis for the inclusion of the 
amount in the judgment and certainly there is no author-
ity in the state court to enter judgment upon a federal 
court order and to issue execution for its collection. 
It is competent to show these matters by a certified 
copy of the federal court order as it would be competent 
to show that a judgment appealed from has been paid or 
that anything subsequent to the entry of the judgment 
has happened to suspend or nullify the judgment. County 
of Dakota v. Henry H. Glidden, 113 U. S. 222; 28 L. ed. 
981. 
In conclusion, we say that each point specified in this 
brief .supported by the assignments of error is fatal to 
the judgment entered. That is to say-the suit could not 
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in the first instance have been sustained because the 
property was exempt. The plaintiff was estopped from 
questioning the existence of the Smith Land Company 
and of the ownership of the contract. If a cause of action 
had existed, it was barred by the Statute of Limitations . 
.Albert S. Wheelwright having ceased to be a party to the 
suit could not be a judgment creditor. No judgment could 
be entered in favor of Aubrey F. Turley except to the 
extent of the yalue of the contJ·act of November 30, 1930, 
in excess of $2300.00 and there was no finding justifying 
any such judgment even as to Turley. The court was 
wholly without jurisdiction or power to insert, or to per-
mit to be inserted, any order of the Federal Bankruptcy 
Court and any order of that court has been suspended if 
not set aside . .And finally, the judgment in and of itself 
is erroneous, if not void upon its face. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J.D. SKEEN, E. J. SKEEN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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